9th Symposium on
Finance, Banking, and Insurance
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Hans G. Heidle and
Roger D. Huang |
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Owen Graduate School
of Management |
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Auction markets are often touted as better trading mechanisms for unmasking informed traders than dealer markets. Our analysis of firms that transfer to an alternative exchange structure suggests that traders are more anonymous in a competing dealer market than in an auction environment. Our evidence also shows that when firms move to a new market structure, the changes in the risk of trading with an informed trader are associated with the changes in the bidask spread. Moreover, the changes in the probability of transacting with an informed trader are more pronounced for firms that are less liquid prior to the relocation. Our results provide evidence of differences in bidask spreads between dealer and auction markets that are induced by differences in market structure. |
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Keywords: Market Microstructure, InformationBased Trading, Trader Anonymity, Trading Costs, Exchange Listing. | |||